Our aim is to design mechanisms that motivate all agents to reveal their predictions truthfully and promptly. For myopic agents, proper scoring rules induce truthfulness. However, when agents have multiple opportunities for revealing information, and take into account long-term effects of their actions, deception and reticence may appear. Such situations have been described in the literature. No simple rules exist to distinguish between the truthful and the untruthful situations, and a determination has been done in isolated cases only. This is of relevance to prediction markets, where the market value is a common prediction, and more generally in informal public prediction forums, such as stock-market estimates by analysts. We describe three different mechanisms, all based on proper scoring rules, that are strategy-proof with non-myopic considerations, and show that one of them, a discounted market scoring rule, meets all our requirements from a mechanism in almost all prediction settings. To illustrate, we extensively analyze a prediction setting with continuous outcomes, and show how our suggested mechanism restores prompt truthfulness in settings where incumbent mechanisms fail.
Introduction
Mechanisms that motivate all agents to reveal their information truthfully and promptly are desirable in many situations.
Consider, for example, the estimation of company earnings by stock-market analysts, a longstanding Wall Street institution. Publicly-traded companies announce their earnings for the latest quarter or year, on dates set well in advance. Each company is typically covered by several stockmarket analysts, the larger ones by dozens. These analysts issue reports containing predictions of a company's future earnings. The timing of such predictions may range from several years to days before earnings announcement, and every analyst typically updates his prediction several times in the interval. These predictions eventually become publicly available (initially, their audience may be restricted), and a consensus calculated from all predictions in force may be viewed on several popular finance websites. Not least, the analysts themselves are aware of, and are no doubt influenced by the actions and opinions of their peers.
In essence, this earnings estimation functions as a public prediction forum, with an evolving consensus, and a termination date: The date when a company announces its true earnings for the forecast period, which we shall call the outcome. It acts as a sort of advisory forum for the public of investors, and this public's interest is best served if analysts share their information and judgement truthfully and promptly.
Prediction markets are public prediction forums organized as markets. A de-facto standard for organizing prediction markets is due to Hanson (2003) , using a market scoring rule. In such a market, probability estimates are rewarded by a proper scoring rule an amount S(p, r), where p is a probability distribution of the outcome, and r is the outcome. A trader in Hanson's markets not only makes her probability estimate public, she changes the market price to it. She then stands to be rewarded by the market maker for her prediction (when the outcome becomes known), but she also commits to compensate the previous trader for his prediction. Her total compensation is therefore the difference S(p, r) − S(p ′ , r) where p ′ is the replaced market "price" (i.e. outcome distribution). When the logarithmic scoring rule (S(p, r) = log p r ) 1 is used in a prediction market, the mechanism is called LMSR (Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule). Hanson also demonstrated how a market maker can facilitate such an LMSR market and provide liquidity by selling and buying shares of each outcome.
Proper scoring rules, are, by their definition, incentive compatible for myopic agents 2 . That is, an agent maximizes her expected score by announcing her true belief, provided longer-term effects of the prediction, if any, are ignored. The incremental, market variation of the scoring rule does not affect this incentive compatibility, because the previous agent's score does not depend on the current prediction. Furthermore, it is a straightforward generalization of Hanson (2003) to apply market scoring rules to multiple-choice, or continuous outcomes (such as in our earnings estimate forum).
However, when an agent is not myopic, and does take into account all consequences of her action, truthfulness will, in many cases, not be her optimal strategy, and incentive compatibility is lost. Such scenarios have been described in the literature, and our paper adds many further examples. As we will show, the damage to incentive compatibility caused by long-term strategic considerations is extensive, and it is a priori unclear whether any remedy is available.
Our aim in this paper is to design incentive mechanisms for predictions that are strategy-proof. We demonstrate the problem with using proper scoring rules for rewarding predictions, as often leading to reticence or deception. We formulate criteria for determining which prediction settings are truthful, and which are not, and apply these criteria for a complete classification of the important class of prediction settings with normal and lognormal signals. We suggest three strategy-proof mechanisms, and identify one of them, discounting, as having all desirable properties. We prove the applicability and effectiveness of the discounting mechanism.
The Problem with Scoring Rules
A scoring rule S : ∆(R) × R → R scores a prediction p, representing a probability distribution of the outcome, a value S(p, r) when the outcome is r. An entity whose belief of the outcome distribution is q has score expectation S(p, q) := Er∼q S(p, r) for prediction p. A proper scoring rule is one for which S(q, q) ≥ S(p, q) for every p, q ∈ ∆(R), so that predicting one's true belief has maximal score expectation. A strictly proper scoring rule is one where the inequality is tight only for p = q. The logarithmic scoring rule S(p, r) = log p r , and the quadratic (a.k.a. Brier) scoring rule S(p, r) = 2p r − p · p − 1 are examples of strictly proper scoring rules. More background on scoring rules may be found, e.g., in Gneiting and Raftery (2007) .
The following generic example illustrates the problem when non-myopic considerations apply.
Example 1. A public wants to predict a variable, whose outcome is x. Every signal of x is, i.i.d.,
x + ǫ with probability 1/2, and x − ǫ with probability 1/2. ǫ is unknown. There is an expert, who gets private signals. The public gets public signals.
-On Monday, public gets a signal.
-On Tuesday, expert gets another signal.
-On Wednesday, outcome x is revealed.
Question: Should expert reveal his information truthfully on Sunday? Answer: No. Whoever sees two different truthful signals is able to calculate the outcome x = (x + ǫ)/2 + (x − ǫ)/2 exactly. For any distribution of ǫ, and for the logarithmic and almost 3 every other scoring rule, the expert should not tell the truth on Sunday. This prevents the 50% probability that the market will know x on Monday, preserving a 75% probability that the expert can announce x on Tuesday.
The canonical case, to which this example belongs, is "Alice-Bob-Alice", where Alice speaks before and after Bob's single speaking opportunity, both are awarded by a proper scoring rule for each prediction, and both maximize their total score. Chen et al. (2010) as well as Chen and Waggoner (2016) studied situations where several agents, each having private information, are given more than one opportunity to make a public prediction. The situations are reducible to the Alice-Bob-Alice game. The proper scoring rule assures that each will tell the truth on their last prediction, and the open question is whether Alice, when going first, will tell the truth, lie, or keep her silence. Chen et al. (2010) make the key observation that truthfulness is optimal if, in a different setup, namely, a single-prediction Alice-Bob game where Alice chooses whether to go first or second, she will always prefer going first. Building on that insight, Chen and Waggoner (2016) show that when the players' information is what they define as "perfect informational substitutes", they will predict truthfully and as early as allowed, when they are "perfect informational complements", they will predict truthfully and as late as allowed, while when players are neither substitutes nor complements, untruthfulness can and will occur. Though this characterization is helpful, it is not an algorithm, and deciding whether signals are informational substitutes, complements, or neither, is far from trivial. Few concrete cases have been settled. The most significant case settled was to show that when signals are independent conditional on the outcome, and the logarithmic scoring rule (LMSR) is used, the signals are informational substitutes, meaning that in such a case, Alice will reveal all her information truthfully in her first round.
A strategy-proof mechanism of the Alice-Bob-Alice setting easily generalizes to a strategy-proof mechanism for any number of experts and any prediction order, because whenever an expert (call her Alice) makes more than one prediction, one can roll together all experts making predictions between Alice's successive predictions into one expert (call him Bob), who share their information and consequently have a shared prediction 4 . This is formally proved in Proposition 12.
Goals of the Mechanism
We seek a mechanism with several desirable traits.
Truthfulness:
The mechanism should motivate all experts to make truthful predictions, that is, to reveal their true subjective distributions of the outcome. At minimum, this means that truth-telling should be a best-response to truth-telling by all other experts, according to the player's beliefs at the time of prediction, i.e., it is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. 5 When a mechanism is not truthful, it may still be locally truthful by which we mean that telling small lies (infinitesimal variations from the truth) are suboptimal, but telling a sufficiently big lie may be advantageous. Of course, this definition can be applied only to continuous outcomes, where lies can be arbitrarily small. 2. Full Disclosure: All information possessed by the experts should be disclosed. This means that every expert makes a (truthful) prediction at some point in time after getting his last signal. Otherwise, the information on the outcome possessed in that last signal would never reach the public. 3. Promptness: Experts should reveal their signals by a truthful public prediction as soon as the prediction schedule allows, and make an updated prediction whenever receiving a new signal, again, at the earliest opportunity. Considerations by experts of when it is optimal to make a prediction are contrary to the interest of the public to have that prediction sooner rather than later. We shall require a strong preference for promptness. Indifference to timing shall not count as prompt. 4. Fairness: A mechanism is fair, if, informally, its rewards are in direct relationship to how much closer a prediction brought the public to the true outcome. There are many ways to define what "how much closer" means. One of these comes from information theory and measures the information content of a prediction with respect to the outcome. This happens to be equal to the score calculated by LMSR, making the Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule "fair" by definition. A fair mechanism, inter alia, would not reward anything to a freeloader: a prediction that repeats the public prediction, and so contributes nothing.
Our Results
We propose three different incentive mechanisms, all of which are based on proper scoring rules, all of which achieve truthfulness, and the third and last also achieves promptness. They are 1. Group prediction: All agents receive the final prediction's (non-incremental) score. Since all agents have a stake in the final prediction, all will reveal their information truthfully. On the negative side, they are not motivated to be prompt about it. Another problem is freeloaders, since agents with no information can participate and gain without contributing anything. 2. Enforce single prediction: Score each of agent's prediction with an incremental scoring rule, and award each agent the minimum score. Agents are therefore motivated to predict once only, since having made a prediction, a further prediction can only lower their reward expectation. With a proper scoring rule, this assures incentive compatibility with truthfulness. Agents are not motivated to be prompt, but instead need to find the optimal timing to make their single prediction. A major drawback is that when agents receive a time-varying signal, they will not reveal all their information. 3. Discounting: Discount each of agent's incremental prediction scores by a monotonically increasing factor of the time. The idea is that if signals are not informational substitutes, they will become ones if a sufficiently steep negative time gradient is applied. When successful, this mechanism achieves the ideal result of motivating all agents to reveal their information truthfully and promptly, including when they receive time-varying signals. We show that, under some light conditions, discounting works whenever scores are not infinite (as they may be with the logarithmic scoring rule, e.g., in Example 1 ). Essentially, this means that discounting will always work unless signals are perfectly correlated, i.e., have a deterministic relation given the outcome (again as in Example 1, where signals are either identical or average to the outcome).
Table 1 summarizes how the incumbent mechanism, and our three proposed mechanisms, measure up against each of the traits we described as desirable in the previous section.
We thoroughly investigate the Alice-Bob-Alice game (and, by extension, multi-player, multisignal games) with both the logarithmic and the quadratic (Brier) scoring rule, when player signals have a multivariate normal distribution or a multivariate lognormal distribution. These distributions are among the best-known continuous distributions and naturally arise in many situations, including, for example, the analyst setting described in the Introduction.
These multivariate distributions are characterized, inter alia, by the correlation coefficient (ρ ∈ [−1, 1]) between Alice's and Bob's signals. When the logarithmic scoring rule is used, we find that when these signals are too well-correlated (whether positively or negatively), prompt truthfulness is not optimal. On the other hand, if the correlation is low, the game will be truthful and prompt. This includes the case ρ = 0, where, as is well-known the signals are conditionally independent, confirming the Chen et al. (2010) result for conditionally independent signals.
However, when the quadratic scoring rule, one of the oldest and most commonly used scoring rules, is used with these multivariate distributions, it is never truthful for repeated predictions.
In all settings with either the logarithmic or the quadratic scoring rules, we show that our discounting mechanism restores prompt truthfulness, with the single exception of perfect correlation (|ρ| = 1) of the players' signals.
We make the observation that information aggregation works differently in the presence of a common-knowledge prior than where the prior is unknown. (The fact that agents have a common prior does not necessarily mean that they know what it is). Whenever there exists a public prediction forum, as for earnings estimates described above, or a market, the initial running consensus or the initial market price serves as a common-knowledge prior. On the other hand, if players do not know what their common prior is, even if they have one, their behavior is as if they have no common prior.
We show that the discounting mechanism can be effectively implemented with an automated market maker, as in Hanson's markets, thus showing that it may be practically applied in prediction markets.
Related Literature
Scoring rules have a very long history, going back to De Finetti (1937), Brier (1950) and Good (1952) . Proper scoring rules are often used for incentive-compatible belief elicitation of risk-neutral agents (e.g. Armantier and Treich (2013) ). Market scoring rules for prediction markets were introduced by Hanson (2003) .
The role of Chen et al. (2010) and Chen and Waggoner (2016) in investigating the strategyproofness of prediction markets was already described. Gao et al. (2013) resolves some more scenarios. Conitzer (2009) also embarks on a program similar to ours, citing mechanism design as a guiding principle. Accordingly, he strives to achieve the Revelation Principle, where all experts announce their private information to some organizing entity that makes the appropriate Bayesian aggregation. As we discuss in Section 2.2 below, we do not share that vision: Experts often do not know what part of their belief stems from truly private information, and even when they do, they cannot afford to announce a prediction which is not based on their best judgement. His "Group-Rewarding Information Mechanism" is similar to our Group Prediction mechanism, and its lack of fairness is pointed out. Conitzer does not propose a mechanism that achieves prompt truthfulness. Chen et al. (2010) also suggest discounting, that "reduces the opportunity for bluffing", in their words, but does not prevent it (Section 9.1), so their discounting mechanism does not achieve our basic requirement of truthfulness. The reason, apparently, is that their formulation is different from ours, applying same discount to before and after scores. On the other hand, we discount every prediction score according to the time its prediction was made. The difference is crucial, because theirs does not result in a true market scoring rule, as defined by Hanson (2003) . In consequence, our Section 2.4, on which our results rest, as well as our Section 5.2, do not apply to their formulation.
We shall occasionally rely on well-known facts of the normal and the multivariate normal distributions. The reader will find the basis for these in, e.g., Tong (2012) .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we formulate the problem. In Section 3 we investigate which predictions settings are already truthful and prompt, and which are not. In Section 4 we offer strategy-proof mechanisms, and show how they can solve the gaps we have found. In Section 5 we summarize and offer concluding remarks. Long proofs are to be found in the Appendix.
Problem Formulation

Basics
Two players, Alice and Bob, make public predictions of a real parameter λ, whose prior distribution is π. The outcome x will be revealed after all predictions have been made. A prediction consists of revealing one's belief of the distribution of λ. Assume all agents take others' predictions as truthful. All agents (Alice, Bob, and the public) are Bayesian, and each prediction causes them to update their beliefs, i.e. the posterior distribution, of λ. 6 The posterior beliefs are distributions of the parameter λ which are inferred from priors and likelihood functions using Bayesian techniques. In our discussion we find it more convenient and succinct to represent beliefs, without loss of generality, by a real number, rather than by a probability distribution. We use the fact that, in Bayesian analysis, when the likelihood functions belong to some family of distributions (e.g. exponential), all posterior beliefs belong to another family of distributions (Gamma distribution for the exponential family) Q(Y ) ∈ ∆(λ), called the conjugate prior of the first family. Y is a set of real parameters of the inferred distribution Q. We will assume models where, one, and only one of these parameters is dependent on previous predictions, while the rest Y \ {x} is known from the model, the timing and the identity of the believer, but does not depend on any previous prediction. An example illustrates this:
Example 2. Assume Alice's belief of λ to be normally distributed N (µ A , 1/τ A ) where µ A is the mean and τ A the accuracy (i.e. inverse of the variance), and Bob's is N (µ B , 1/τ B ) and independent of Alice's. τ A and τ B are set by the model and are commonly known. Assume an uninformative prior. Using well-known aggregation rules for independent normal observations, if Alice announces µ A , Bob's belief changes to the normally distributed N (µ AB , 1/τ AB ), where
Notice that, with the assumptions made that the sequence of events (Alice's announcement) is known and τ A , τ B are commonly known, τ AB can be calculated without knowing any of the means µ A , µ B , while µ AB can be evaluated once µ A and µ B is known.
In this known context we are therefore able to describe a prediction by a single real number (the mean) rather than by a probability distribution. We shall say that Alice's prior belief A 1 is µ A and Bob's prior belief B 1 is µ B . After Alice makes her prediction, Bob's belief changes to µ AB . After Alice and Bob both make a prediction, the public's belief is µ AB . In the context, these statements are unambiguously equivalent to specifying the relevant probability distributions.
The prior π may be uninformative, assigning equal probabilities to all possibilities 7 , or, if not, as also representable by a parameter. For example, if Alice and Bob participate in a prediction market, the prior parameter is the market value before Alice's first prediction.
Time is discrete, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T , with T the time the outcome is known. A t , B t , C t ∈ R are, respectively, Alice's, Bob's and the public's (or market's) beliefs at time t. At t = 1, A 1 , B 1 , C 1 are their respective prior beliefs. Any prediction takes place at t > 1. t = 0 is "pre-prior" time, when players beliefs are equal to their private signals, so that A 0 , B 0 are respectively, Alice and Bob's private signals. At t = 1, each player is additionally aware of the public prior C 1 , so that A 1 is an inference from A 0 and C 1 while B 1 is an inference from B 0 and C 1 . If the public prior is uninformative, then we have A 0 = A 1 and B 0 = B 1 . In other words, the players' priors equal their private signals. For completeness, we define C 0 = C 1 (the public's initial prediction, before any prediction was made, is the prior distribution).
To avoid degenerate exceptions, we assume the players' signals are informative. This means that A 1 = C 1 and B 1 = C 1 .
The signals have a common-knowledge joint distribution f (a, b; λ) conditional on the parameter
The order of predictions is Alice, Bob, then Alice again, and then the outcome x is revealed. A twice-differentiable, w.r.t. λ, proper scoring rule S(p, λ) incrementally rewards each prediction made, i.e., if a player's prediction changed the public's belief from p ′ to p, the player's reward for this prediction, calculated when x is known, is
Each player seeks to maximize their total reward.
As the scoring rule is proper, Bob will tell the truth on his only prediction, and Alice will tell the truth on her second and last prediction. The remaining question is whether Alice will tell the truth on her first prediction. More accurately, the question is of equilibrium: If Bob is truthful, and Bob and the public take Alice's predictions as truthful, is truth-telling Alice's best response?
Knowledge Model
As will be shown, the players behavior is affected by their common-knowledge prior, by which we mean a belief distribution which is explicitly known to both players and from which each inferred his or her current belief. That the common prior is commonly known is important, because it is quite possible, and even likely, that the players share a prior but do not know what it is. For example, in predicting a poll, Alice and Bob may be basing themselves on knowledge of how their acquaintances voted, but they may not know which acquaintances they have in common. Or, they both may be basing themselves on a paper they read, but neither is aware that the other has read it. If the players do not know what their common prior is, they cannot infer anything from having one, and their behavior is the same as on the assumption that they have a non-informative prior (a prior that assigns equal probability to all possibilities).
In prediction markets, and more generally in public prediction forums where all communication is done in public, the common-knowledge prior is known: It is the initial market value C 1 (which is a parameter that determines distribution π), when the Alice-Bob-Alice game starts. I.e. A 1 , Alice's prior belief and B 1 , Bob's prior belief, are both inferred from C 1 .
Inferences from Predictions
Assume that inference functions are invertible, so that if a player's prediction is known, her signal can be computed. If Alice announces A 1 = a, the posterior outcome distribution can be calculated from the known f (a, b; λ). Mark it g(a).
Similarly, if Alice announces A 1 = a, and Bob privately observes B 1 = b, Bob's posterior outcome is inferred from f (a, b; λ). It will become the public prediction when Bob announces it. Mark it h(a, b).
Maximizing the Reward
How does Alice maximize her total reward for both her predictions? And is this maximum achieved by telling the truth on both predictions? We will show that Alice maximizes her reward by minimizing Bob's reward, and therefore is truthful if truth minimizes Bob's reward.
Proposition 1. Alice maximizes her expected total reward by making a first prediction that minimizes Bob's expected reward, where expectations are taken according to Alice's beliefs on her first prediction.
Proof. Let A 1 = a, B 1 = b. Assume that Alice, on her first prediction, announces her prediction aŝ a, where possiblyâ = a. Alice's belief at this time is g(a), while all other agents' beliefs after Alice's announcement is g(â). As discussed, Bob's prediction and Alice's second prediction are truthful. Therefore, after Bob's prediction the public belief is h(â, b). After Alice's second and last prediction, which is truthful, the public belief is h(a, b) . Alice's total reward given outcome
Bob's total reward given outcome
The sum of Bob's and Alice's rewards is
, which does not depend onâ. Therefore theâ that maximizes Alice's reward is the one that minimizes Bob's reward. This is true for every x and b, and therefore it is also true for Alice's reward expectation at the time of her first prediction. This is before Alice learned that B 1 = b, but had a conditional distribution of it b ∼ B 1 |(A 1 = a) based on her belief. In summary
Corollary 1. If a truthful first prediction minimizes Alice's expectation of Bob's reward, i.e., if
is minimized atâ = a, then truth is Alice's best policy.
A corollary that we will find useful is the following. If, for every c = 0, and every b, ∆(c; a, b) > 0, Alice will be promptly truthful. Alternatively, if, for every c = 0, and every b, ∆(c; a, b) < 0, Alice will not be promptly truthful.
Proof. If Alice assumes B 1 = b when her belief is g(a), then Alice's assumed belief is h(a, b), and so her expectation of Π B (x; a,â, b) is, by (4), s(h(â, b), h(a, b))− s(g(â), g(a)). So the corollary assumes that truth (â = a) minimizes Alice's expectation of Bob's reward for every b, and therefore also Alice's total expectation of Bob's reward. The truth of the corollary follows by Corollary 1.
Local truthfulness depends only on the sign of the second derivative of Alice's expectation of Π B (x; a,â, b) .
Proposition 2. Let A 1 = a. Assume that Alice, on her first prediction, announces her prediction asâ, where possiblyâ = a. Alice will be locally truthful if
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that if Alice is locally truthful, she may still not be truthful, but an advantageous lie for her must be big. That is, she will be truthful iff E
Conversely, if Alice is not locally truthful, then she is not truthful. Formally
Corollary 3. Under the conditions of Proposition 2, truthfulness is not optimal for the players if
3 Which Prediction Settings are Already Truthful?
We described above (Example 1) an elementary setting that is not truthful, and a handful of other settings have been settled either way in the literature. But in the landscape of prediction settings that are of interest, the coverage has been very sparse. Beyond Chen and Waggoner (2016)'s criterion of "Informational Substitutes", which does not amount to an explicit algorithm 8 , we have no procedure to settle any given case, and the problem remains opaque.
With the results we derived in Section 2.4, we now have such procedures. We shall apply them to classify settings belonging to the most commonly-met continuous distributions and the most commonly used scoring rules. The distributions are:
-The multivariate normal distribution N (µ, Σ). In contrast to general joint distributions, where the interdependence of components may take practically any form, the interdependence of joint multivariate normal components is completely determined by their covariance matrix. This means that in the Alice-Bob-Alice game, the signals interdependence is completely determined by a single real parameter: their correlation coefficient −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Our investigation boils down to finding for what values of ρ Alice will be promptly truthful. -The multivariate lognormal distribution Y = exp(X), where X is a multivariate normal distribution as described in the previous item. Stock prices, and their derivatives, are commonly modelled by a lognormal distribution. Since taking logs transform multivariate lognormal random variables to multivariate normal random variables, our classification of the multivariate normal distribution readily provides a classification of this distribution too.
The scoring rules we cover are -The Logarithmic Scoring Rule S(p, r) = log p r . As mentioned, this proper scoring rule is employed as Hanson's LMSR market-maker. It has strong information theory roots, and is uniquely local, i.e. depending only on the distribution at the outcome (r). -The Brier/Quadratic Scoring Rule S(p, r) = 2p r − p · p − 1. It is the earliest scoring rule, introduced by Brier (1950) , in the context of weather forecasting.
Multivariate Normal Distribution
Let the public prior π be distributed N (C 0 , 1/τ C ), where τ C = 1/σ 2 C is the accuracy. C 0 is the public's prediction mean at the start of the game. Note that an uninformative prior is characterized by having an arbitrarily large variance σ 2 C , or equivalently an arbitrarily small accuracy τ C , and in such a case, the value of C 0 is inconsequential.
Similarly, Alice's and Bob's priors are distributed N (A 1 , 1/τ AC ) and N (B 1 , 1/τ BC ), respectively, where τ AC = 1/σ 2 AC and τ BC = 1/σ 2 BC are the respective accuracies. A 1 , B 1 are the means of, respectively, Alice's and Bob's prior predictions. Alice's prediction A 1 is inferred from the public prior C 0 and Alice's signal A 0 , and similarly for Bob.
We lose no generality in assuming that each of the player's signals is conditionally independent of the prior. Because, if Alice, e.g., is aware of the public prior C 0 and her prior prediction A 1 , she can consistently assume that her signal π A is distributed N
It is easy to verify that π A and π are mutually independent. Note that τ AC > τ C since we assume Alice's signal is informative, hence τ A > 0.
For an uninformative prior τ C = 0 this degenerates to A 0 = A 1 , B 0 = B 1 , as can be expected. By assumption the private signals π A , π B and the public prior π belong to a jointly multivariate normal distribution, and as such, their joint distribution is completely determined by their means and by their covariance matrix. Since π A , π B are, w.l.o.g., conditionally independent of π, the distributions are uncorrelated with π, and the covariance matrix M for (π A , π B , π) is
where ρ ∈ [−1, 1] is the correlation coefficient of π A and π B , defined as:
As is well-known (e.g. Tong (2012) ), components of a multivariate normal distribution are independent iff they are uncorrelated, i.e. have ρ = 0.
Note that ρ is not the same as the correlation coefficient of Alice's and Bob's priors, the distributions N (A 1 , 1/τ AC ) and N (B 1 , 1/τ BC ), respectively. It would seem that these distributions cannot be conditionally independent, as they share a common prior. In fact, they can, but for them to be conditionally independent, their original signals need to be suitably negatively correlated.
Proposition 3. The player prior predictions are conditionally independent iff
Proof. See Appendix
Proposition 4. Assume that the model, including covariance matrix M (8), is common knowledge. Then, knowing everyone's prior prediction A 1 , B 1 and C 0 , the posterior, marked π ABC , has distribution N (µ ABC , 1/τ ABC ), with
With Logarithmic Scoring
Proposition 5. Let Alice's, Bob's and the public signals in an Alice-Bob-Alice game belong to a jointly multivariate normal distribution, with covariance matrix given in (8). When using the logarithmic scoring rule, the players optimal strategy is truthfulness and promptness iff
In particular, we note in Proposition 5 that the case |ρ| = 1 is untruthful, and more generally the same is true when the correlation coefficient is either too positive or too negative. The middle ground is truthful. In particular, substituting ρ = 0, where the players' signals are conditionally independent, is found to be truthful. This is a special case of the result of Chen et al. (2010) (Theorem 5) for conditionally independent signals with the logarithmic scoring rule.
Also in particular, if the common prior is uninformative, or unknown, we get by substituting τ C = 0 in Proposition 5 and solving for ρ.
Corollary 4. Let Alice's and Bob's signals in an Alice-Bob-Alice game belong to a jointly multivariate normal distribution, with covariance matrix given in (8), and an uninformative or unknown common prior (τ C = 0). Then, with the logarithmic scoring rule, the players optimal strategy is truthfulness and promptness iff
In particular, if σ A = σ B , truthfulness and promptness holds whenever ρ ≥ − 1 2 .
With Quadratic Scoring On the other hand, when using the Quadratic Scoring Rule, when the signals belong to a multivariate normal distribution, truthfulness is never optimal. This is summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Let Alice's, Bob's and the public signals in an Alice-Bob-Alice game belong to a jointly multivariate normal distribution, with covariance matrix given in (8). Then, when using the quadratic scoring rule, truthfulness is never Alice's optimal strategy. Alice is, however, locally
Remarkably, the result is unaffected by the prior (σ C ).
Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
Group Prediction
Our first strategy-proof mechanism scores the last prediction made by a proper scoring rule, and awards the score to each of the participating experts.
Proposition 7. Let x be the outcome, and let the last prediction made before the outcome is revealed be distribution p. Then the mechanism that awards S(p, x) to each participating player, where S is a proper scoring rule, is truthful. Furthermore, the mechanism elicits full disclosure.
Proof. We show that truthfulness by all players is a Nash equilibrium, by showing that for each player, given truthfulness by every other player, if the player received her last signal, her bestresponse behavior is to make a truthful prediction. For suppose a player has received her last signal before the outcome is revealed. The player is aware of all her signals, as well as of previous predictions by her colleagues who have spoken. The player then hypothesizes the following: First, that she makes a truthful prediction now, and second, she hypothesizes some sequence S of predictions by other players, subject to the condition that all other players report truthfully their last signal (at least). The sequence ends in a last prediction p(S). Under the hypothesis, p(S) is the player's subjective posterior distribution of the outcome from knowing all information in the (hypothetical) setting. Furthermore, it is the distribution that will be scored by the mechanism. That is to say, the player's score expectation for the scenario is S(p, p). Now, if the player deviates, by predicting untruthfully, or by failing to predict, the last prediction, still under the hypothesis, will be q. Now since S is proper, S(p, p) ≥ S(q, p) for any q, and therefore there is no gain in deviating.
As this is true for any hypothetic future sequence S, predicting truthfully at present is a bestresponse regardless of the future.
Note that the proof shows a Nash, rather than a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, because truth is a best-response in every future scenario, and no expectations are taken.
Also note that the mechanism does not motivate promptness, which is only weakly optimal. Players may make predictions as late as possible without harming their welfare. Therefore players may also pass on making predictions before getting their last signals.
Another drawback of the mechanism is its unfairness: It awards all experts the same, regardless of their contribution. Indeed, a so-called expert who has no information of his own may reap the same reward as other experts by simply repeating the current public prediction. Attempts to fix this by a fairer division of the reward would be counterproductive, compromising truthfulness. For example, if the reward policy is changed to not award anything to "predictions" that merely repeat the public prediction, an uninformed expert can sidestep that by slightly modifying the current public prediction.
Enforce Single Prediction
Since multiple predictions are the source of the potential for manipulation, a mechanism that prevents that would restore general truthfulness.
Proposition 8. Let S be a proper scoring rule. The mechanism that scores each prediction with the increment S(p, x) − S(p ′ , x), where p is the predicted distribution and p ′ the previous public prediction, and rewards each expert with the minimum score out of all her predictions, is truthful.
Proof. Once an expert has made a prediction, a further prediction may only lower her reward expectation and so is not optimal. Since incremental, proper scoring rules are incentive compatible with the last prediction, the expert optimal strategy is to make a single, truthful prediction.
While this mechanism is truthful, and fair, it does not motivate promptness. Every expert plans to make a single prediction, and needs to figure out the best time to do it, given other players' strategies, resulting in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. As Azar et al. (2016) show, this can be complex even when there is only one expert. Furthermore, unlike the previous mechanism it does not disclose all available information, since experts may choose to make a prediction before getting their final signal.
Discounting
The last, and, we will argue, the most successful mechanism we suggest for incentive compatibility is discounting.
Discounting essentially uses a proper market scoring rule mechanism. As explained in the Introduction, for a proper scoring rule S(p, r), the market scoring rule scores a prediction p with the difference S(p, r) − S(p ′ , r) where p ′ is the outcome distribution that was replaced by p, and r is the outcome. We use the fact that any scoring rule can be scaled by an arbitrary constant k and remain proper. Furthermore, a market scoring rule can use kS(p, r) − k ′ S(p ′ , r) where k, k ′ may be different. Generally, we can employ a time-varying scale factor k(t) ∈ R >0 , and use the proper scoring rule k(t)S(p, r), where t is the time (which may be the elapsed time from some base, or an integer counter of events) of announcement of p. Discounting means choosing k(t) that is weakly decreasing in t, whence we get a discounted scoring rule D(p, r) := k(t)S(p, r), where t is the time of prediction p, and a discounted market scoring rule for prediction p
where t ′ is the time replaced prediction p ′ was made.
The idea of discounting, in the Alice-Bob-Alice game is that, if without discounting Alice's optimal strategy (assuming truthfulness by Bob) is to hide or distort information on her first prediction, in order to reap a bigger benefit on her second prediction, her calculus will change if a sufficiently steep discount, motivating earlier predictions, is imposed on her reward.
We must be careful to use non-positive scoring rules with the discounting mechanism. Otherwise the possibility exists that the discounted scoring rule will have negative score expectation for a prediction, creating a situation in which a player will prefer not predicting to making a truthful prediction. On the other hand, for non-positive scoring rules, S(p, r) ≤ 0, so that, whenever 0 ≤
So, if our original scoring rule had positive expectation, so does our discounted one. Note that the logarithmic scoring rule log p r and quadratic scoring rule 2p r − p · p − 1, which we have analyzed, are non-positive. Any scoring rule can be made non-positive by affine transform.
Proposition 9. Using the notation of Section 2.3, if S is a non-positive scoring rule, and there exists K such that
for every A 1 = a and every possibleâ, then the game is promptly truthful with a discount factor k(t) that satisfies k(t 1 )/k(t 2 ) ≥ K, where t 1 is the time of Alice's first prediction and t 2 is the time of the second.
Proof. (13) states the condition for scoring rule k(t)S(p, r) to satisfy Corollary 1.
From Proposition 9, we may state sufficient conditions for discounting to succeed. Then there exists a discount factor effective at restoring truthfulness.
Proof. Since S is strictly proper, and if the nominator of (13) is bounded, (13) can be unbounded only at infinity or atâ = a. Atâ = a, (13) evaluates to 0 0 , so we invoke L'Hôpital's rule to find the limit. Since first derivatives again evaluate to 0 0 , by the definition of a proper score rule, we must invoke L'Hôpital again for second derivatives.
Discounting can restore truthfulness in the untruthful settings we found in Section 3.
Proposition 10. Let Alice's, Bob's and the public signals in an Alice-Bob-Alice game belong to a jointly multivariate normal distribution, with covariance matrix given in (8). When using the discounted logarithmic scoring rule k(t) log p r , players are truthful and prompt iff signals are not perfectly correlated (i.e. |ρ| < 1) and
where t 1 is the time of Alice's first prediction and t 2 is the time of the second.
Since Alice's signal is informative, τ A > 0, Proposition 10 shows that discounting will be effective unless |ρ| = 1. This simplified discounting (omitting the denominator in (14)) will suffice for truthfulness and promptness.
Proposition 11. Let Alice's, Bob's and the public signals in an Alice-Bob-Alice game belong to a jointly multivariate normal distribution, with covariance matrix given in (8). Then, iff signals are not perfectly correlated (i.e. |ρ| < 1), there exists a discounted quadratic scoring rule k(t)[2p r − p · p − 1] for which players are truthful and prompt.
Finally, we can formulate a proposition for the prompt truthfulness of a general prediction forum.
Proposition 12. Let there be a public, and a set of experts, predicting a parameter λ. There is a fixed schedule in [0, T ] by which experts and public receive signals, and experts may make a prediction. Each agent may receive multiple signals, and experts may have multiple prediction opportunities. The forum is generally truthful and prompt with a discount function k(t) ∈ R >0 that makes all Alice-Bob-Alice subgames in the schedule truthful and prompt. These subgames are all occurrences where any expert, identified as "Alice", has two consecutive prediction opportunities, and all experts who makes predictions in between are rolled into a single player identified as "Bob".
Discussion
Conclusions
-We have demonstrated the problem with using proper scoring rules for rewarding predictions, as often leading to reticence or deception. -We formulated criteria for determining which prediction settings are truthful, and which are not. -We made a complete classification of the important class of prediction settings with normal and lognormal signals, under the logarithmic and quadratic scoring rules. -We suggested three new strategy-proof mechanisms, and identified one of them, discounting, as having all desirable properties. -We proved the applicability and effectiveness of the discounting mechanism. Hanson (2003) has shown that every market scoring rule can be implemented by an automated market maker, who provides liquidity, and is willing to make any fair trade in shares of the form "pay $1 if outcome is r", for every r. This applies to our discounting mechanism for the logarithmic scoring rule, which, as noted, takes the form of a market scoring rule for S(p, r) = k(t) log p r .
A Market Maker for the Discounting Mechanism
Applying Hanson's explanations to our case, if at t there is an inventory s of shares s r for every r, the instantaneous share price is
Assuming an infinitesimal trade path, this induces a cost function C(s, t). The cost of a trade changing the inventory from s to s ′ at t ′ is, , is
Since k(t) is weakly decreasing in t, differentiating the above expression with respect to t ′ shows that the more any trade with the automated market maker is delayed, the higher its cost.
Proof. As s is proper, for every b
Since h(a, b) is a conditional distribution on g(a), by the Law of Total Expectation we have
s(g(â), λ) = s(g(â), g(a))
From the above and (4) we have that
, and so is a local minimum iff its second derivative is positive, or, equivalently, if (5) holds.
B Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. The correlation coefficient of the players' prior distribution, which we mark ρ A 1 B 1 is related to the correlation coefficient of the players' private signals by the following relation. From (7)
Solving ρ A 1 B 1 = 0 we get (9).
C Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof. We know the player signals A 0 , B 0 from their prior predictions A 1 , B 1 by (7). First, let us calculate the posterior distribution π AB ∼ N (µ AB , 1/τ AB ) from Alice's signal π A ∼ N (A 0 , 1/τ A ) and Bob's, π B ∼ N (B 0 , 1/τ B ), alone.
Define an auxiliary signal π ′
Then π AB is inferred from π A , π ′ B by the standard inference rule for independent normal observations.
Substituting for α and simplifying, we get
Now, as the public signal π ∼ N (π, 1/τ C ) is independent of both π A and π B , it is independent of π AB . Applying again the inference rule for independent normal observations, we have
Substituting (16) and (17) in (19) and (18) we get (10) and (11).
D Proof of Proposition 3.3
We first prove a lemma for divergences of the logarithmic scoring rule.
Lemma 1. Let s be the logarithmic scoring rule, and let p ∼ N (µ, 1/τ ) andp ∼ N (μ, 1/τ ) be two normal distributions with the same accuracy τ . Then
Proof.
where we used the fact that the second moment of N (µ, σ 2 ) is σ 2 + µ 2 . Consequently (substitute p forp above),
and the lemma follows.
The proof of the proposition follows.
Proof. We use Corollary 2. Suppose that A 1 = a, and that Alice, when making her first prediction, pretends that A 1 =â := a + c ′ , where c ′ = τ A τ A +τ C c. I.e., by (7), Alice pretends her signal is A 0 + c. By the Corollary, Alice is truthful if
, g(a)) − s(g(a), g(a)) ≥ 0 for everyâ and b. g(a), Alice's distribution at her first prediction, is given by (??) and (7). When B 1 = b, the inferred distribution from Alice's and Bob's predictions h(a, b) is given by Proposition 4. Substituting these, and using Lemma 1:
(21) shows that c = 0, i.e., truthfulness, is either a global minimum or a global maximum of ∆(c; a, b) depending on the sign of the factor multiplying c 2 . Furthermore, this factor does not depend on b (nor on a), and therefore Corollary 2 applies: Alice is promptly truthful iff
Rearranging, we get
as claimed.
E Proof of Proposition 3.5
We first prove a lemma for divergences of the quadratic scoring rule.
Lemma 2. Let s be the quadratic scoring rule, and let p ∼ N (µ, 1/τ ) andp ∼ N (μ, 1/τ ) be two normal distributions with the same accuracy τ . Then
Proof.p
Letting c → ∞ we deduce lim c→∞ ∆(c; a, b) = 1 √ 2π (−τ ABC + τ AC ) < 0 (28) because τ ABC > τ AC , since π ABC 's distribution is conditional on π AC , and Bob's signal is informative. As this does not depend on a nor on b, the setting is not truthful. While not (globally) truthful, Alice may still be locally truthful. By Proposition 2, we need to find out when ∂ ∂c 2 ∆(c; a, b) c=0 > 0. From (27), noting that ∂ ∂x 2 ye −zx 2 x=0 = −2yz.
As this is true for every b, we deduce that local truthfulness holds for 1 − ρ 2 > 1 − ρ τ B τ A . This entails 0 < ρ < σ A σ B , as claimed.
F Proof of Proposition 4.5
Proof. Referring to the proof of Proposition 5, from (22), clearly a discount factor k(t) that satisfies
will be effective. Rearranging this expression, the proposition follows.
G Proof of Proposition 4.6
Proof. The logarithmic scoring rule is bounded. Referring to the proof of Propostion 6, from (27) we see that Proof. We prove the proposition by backward induction. Suppose that a discount factor k(t) has been applied that would be sufficient to make all Alice-Bob-Alice interactions, with a "composite" Bob as described in the proposition, promptly truthful.
Assume that general prompt truthfulness is not in equilibrium. Call "Alice" the last player who is motivated to deviate from prompt truthfulness. This necessarily means that this is not Alice's last prediction, and that all players who make predictions between Alice's current prediction and her next one (call them Bobbies) are truthful.
Referring to Corollary 1 and its proof, it is readily seen that Alice maximizes her reward by minimizing the aggregate score of all Bobbies. Now, with a market scoring rule, in an interval where all players tell the truth, the aggregate score is the difference in score between final public information (public's distribution before Alice speaks again) and initial public information (public's distribution after Alice deviated). The sequence of events that led from initial information to final information has no effect on the aggregate score.
Any one of those Bobbies (call him Bob) has the same initial information, and, since all Bobbies speak the truth, the same final information. If we attribute all the signals of all Bobbies to Bob, we would again have the same initial information and same final information. By Corollary 1, Alice would tell the truth to minimize Bob's expected aggregate score. She would therefore do the same to minimize the Bobbies' aggregate score, contradicting our assumption that she deviates. This proves that no player deviates from prompt truthfulness.
